Matchings and Markets (ECON 688)

2021 Spring
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Ahmet Alkan,
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Doctoral, Master
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Game theoretic analysis of the matching of individuals with other individuals or items, typically across two sides, as in marriage, university placement, employment, housing. Competitive cooperative solutions: existence, optimality order structures, constructive procedures; strategic properties; auctions, mechanisms; institution and market design.


Upon completion of this course, students should be able to:
1. Identify outcomes which are ?stable? or in ?competitive equilibrium? and provide proofs for their existence.
2. Describe the common-interest order (lattice) structure of stable and competitive equilibrium outcomes.
3. Describe procedures/algorithms (the Deferred Acceptance and Multi-object Auction) that find stable outcomes which are optimal for one side of the market.
4. Describe features which lead to ?assortative? outcomes.
5. Describe ?unravelling? and inefficiencies under imperfect information.
6. Explain the workings of an existing matching market (e.g., student university placement) and review desirable/undesirable aspects with reference to benchmark outcomes.
7. Blend tools and solution concepts of cooperative and noncooperative game theory.
8. Substantiate notions of economic design as ?mechanism/institution?, ?efficiency?, ?fairness?.
9. Visualize/analyze a ?market? with reference to abstract models.
10. Apply basic mathematical reasoning and give elementary proofs.