Clearing Supply and Demand Under Bilateral Constraints

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Abstract

In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary bipartite graph. Typically, supply is short in one segment of the market, while demand is short in another.

Information about individual preferences is private, and so is information about feasible links: an agent may unilaterally close one of her links if it is in her interest to do so.

Our egalitarian transfer solution rations only the long side in each market segment, equalizing the net transfers of rationed agents as much as permitted by the bilateral constraints. It elicits a truthful report of both preferences and links: removing a feasible link is never profitable to either one of its two agents. Together with efficiency, and a version of equal treatment of equals, these properties are characteristic.

Keywords: Bipartite graph, bilateral trade, Strategy-proofness, Equal treatment of equals, Single-peaked preferences.

JEL codes: C72, D63, D61, C78, D71.

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1 Introduction

There are markets where transactions cannot be accompanied by monetary transfers. The examples studied in the recent literature include the barter of indivisible goods (Shapley and Scarf 1974, Ma 1998, Papai 2007), medical labor markets (Roth and Peranson 1999), school choice (Pathak and Sönmez 2008), house allocation (Ergin 2002) and several other markets which can be modeled as matching problems (Gale and Shapley 1962, Roth and Sotomayor 1990). In the absence of a price signal, direct decentralized agreements between participants may be impractical\(^1\), or fail to achieve an efficient allocation of resources\(^2\). If a centralized mechanism is able to collect unbiased information about private characteristics of the concerned agents and to implement an efficient outcome, it stands as a convincing alternative to market clearing driven by bilateral agreements.

We study a simple moneyless market balancing the supply and demand for a non-storable, not freely-disposable, and non transferable commodity. Think of a group of service providers with limited control over their load of customers on a given day, so that some providers will receive more customer requests than they care to handle, while the load of other providers falls short of their ideal level. Emergency departments (ED) of hospitals routinely divert incoming patients away when they reach their capacity (NJHA 2009). The premature babies are transferred to other neonatal intensive care facilities when there are no vacant incubators in the hospital where the baby was born (BBC 2007, Priest 2008). Airlines transfer travelers around when they cannot honor their bookings. Similar opportunities for mutually advantageous spreading of the total work load arise routinely between hotels of comparable quality, or taxi companies in a given city, salesmen sharing customers, teachers sharing students, etc.. In such situations cash transfers are typically ruled out because they are not part of the organization’s culture (as between co-workers), or because they would generate high transaction costs (hotel managers or taxi operators). In other situations there are ethical or legal reasons for ruling them out: public hospitals cannot entertain a kickback for referring a patient away.

Despite the absence of money, the process of clearing supply against demand retains the intrinsic characteristic of markets: individual preferences is the private information of each participant, and a centralized mechanism should elicit this information correctly. Hospitals declaring they have

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\(^1\)As in the case of the market for medical residents, see Roth and Peranson 1999.

\(^2\)As when successive mutually profitable new matches result in a cycle: see Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
reached "red status" signal they cannot provide adequate service to an incremental patient, a largely subjective statement unverifiable by an outsider;\footnote{NJHA 2009 notes that "Diversions may be overridden by the emergency physician in charge when medical judgement indicates that the diverting hospital can handle a certain patient better than the alternative hospital."} the ideal number of students in a class is not the same for all instructors, and the same applies to all manners of workload.

In our model the commodity (customers, patients) is homogenous and comes in divisible amounts. The former assumption is a realistic simplification in the taxi, hotel or student examples; ditto in the hospital example if we restrict attention to a given type of emergency patients (say, obstetrics, or post-natal care). The latter assumption is mostly technical (see concluding comments). Preferences of each agent are single-peaked around his ideal/target level (in particular, preferences are convex), and the market participants are either suppliers (agents whose initial endowment exceeds their ideal consumption of the commodity) or demanders (whose endowment is below their target consumption).

The richness of our model is to allow for arbitrary feasibility constraints on transfers between suppliers and demanders, and to view these constraints as private information as well. A centralized mechanism must elicit from the participants the set of feasible links (pairs of one supplier and one demander between which transfers are feasible); agents cannot report an unfeasible link, but are free to "close" unilaterally a feasible link. Such constraints are pervasive in our motivating examples: a given hospital can only divert patients to "nearby" hospitals with adequate facilities; transfers between salespersons are constrained by their proficiency in various languages, and so on. In our model the bipartite graph of links is endogenous, because agents will close some links if it is in their interest to do so.\footnote{In recent literature on buyer-seller networks (e.g., Kranton and Minehart 2000, Corominas-Bosch 2004), agents can similarly pay to establish a link with one another. Our model is however very different in that monetary transfers are ruled out.}

We show that a centralized organization of the market is compatible with truthful revelation of both individual preferences and feasible links (in the strong sense of dominant strategy). This is relevant to some debates in the patients allocation example, where there is evidence that decentralized diversion is wasteful, and some attempts at centralization are being developed.\footnote{REDDINET (http://www.reddinet.com) is a medical communications network linking hospitals in several California counties, for the purpose of improving the efficiency of patients’ allocation.}

Our egalitarian transfer mechanism is simple and well known in the
Figure 1: Short supply and short demand co-exist

special case of our model where transfers are not restricted: there are no bilateral constraints, any supplier can transfer commodity to any demander. Then the short side of the market gets the ideal transfer, and the long side is uniformly rationed (Barbera and Jackson 1995; Klaus et al. 1998). Under bilateral constraints two complications arise.

First, short supply and short demand typically coexist in the same problem, but in two segments of the market that do not interact in any efficient outcome. Here is a numerical example.

Clearly $S_1$ is a captive market for $D_1$, a short demand against $S_1$’s long supply. Similarly $\{D_2, D_3\}$ is captive of $\{S_2, S_3, S_4\}$, who are the short supply against $\{D_2, D_3\}$’s long demand. Note that $D_1$ and $S_2$ achieve their ideal consumption by a transfer of 6 units. However this transfer would shut out $S_1$ who can only send her surplus to $D_1$. It is more efficient to transfer 6 units from $S_1$ to $D_1$, then let $S_2, S_3, S_4$ give their 18 units to demanders 2 and 3.

A familiar graph-theoretical result, the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition (Ore 1962), determines the partition of the market in up to three segments, and the corresponding structure of Pareto optimal allocations: in one seg-

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\(^6\)If the sum of demanders’ peaks is larger than the sum of suppliers’ peaks, we speak of short supply. Each supplier unloads an amount of commodity equal to her peak, and the total supply is rationed among demanders according to the uniform rationing method. Symmetrically, if the demand is short, each demander gets her ideal amount of commodity and the suppliers are uniformly rationed.
ment supply is overdemanded, and the corresponding receivers are rationed; in the second segment supply is underdemanded, and the corresponding receivers eat more than their ideal share; and in the third segment (not present in the example above), supply exactly balances demand.

The second complication is that agents in the long side do not simply get either their ideal transfer or a common transfer, as in Sprumont (1991). Consider the following example:

Here the entire supply is short against a long demand. Absent the bilateral constraints, each demander would receive 7 units. Under the above constraints, the most egalitarian distribution is 10 units for $D_1$, 8 units for $D_2$, and 5 units for each of $D_3$ and $D_4$.

In a segment of the market with short supply (or short demand), the feasibility constraints take the form of core stability in a certain cooperative game, and the egalitarian transfers are the egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray 1989) of this game. The compact definition of our solution is as the Lorenz dominant profile of transfers within the Pareto set (Proposition 2).

Thus our solution is much more difficult to compute than in the absence of bilateral constraints (Klaus et al. 1998). First we must find the Gallai Edmonds decomposition, next we must solve a finite number of submodular linear systems (see section 4). Remarkably, the essential features of unconstrained uniform rationing are preserved, namely Efficiency (Pareto

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5This is also true in the unconstrained model (de Frutos and Masso 1995).
Optimality), and Strategyproofness (truthful revelation of one’s preferences is a dominant strategy). The fairness properties of equal treatment of equals and no envy are also satisfied, provided we adapt their definition to take the constraints into account (see section 5). Last but not least, in our mechanism every participant has no incentive to close a feasible link, as expressed by the link monotonicity property: whenever a link \(ij\) becomes feasible, ceteris paribus, neither supplier \(i\) nor demander \(j\) can be worse off.

Our main result (theorem 2, section 6), characterizes the egalitarian transfer mechanism by the combination of efficiency, strategyproofness, voluntary trade (no one prefers to walk out of the market, a consequence of link monotonicity), and (constrained) equal treatment of equals.

In the absence of bilateral constraints, and with agents’ endowments known, a parallel result, with a stronger version of the standard equal treatment of equals, was established in Klaus et al. (1998).

In the companion paper Bochet et al. (2009), we analyze with the same techniques a one-sided version of the present model, that is a constrained generalization of Sprumont’s fair division model (Sprumont 1991). The suppliers are now passive, they must unload a given amount of the commodity among the set of receivers, who each have a private ideal consumption level. See the concluding comments in section 6.

2 Preferences and feasible allocations

We have a set \(S\) of suppliers with generic element \(i\), and a set \(D\) of demanders with generic element \(j\). A set of transfers of the single commodity from suppliers to demanders results in a vector \((x, y) \in \mathbb{R}^+_S \times \mathbb{R}^+_D\) where \(x_i\) (resp. \(y_j\)) is supplier \(i\)’s (resp. demander \(j\)’s) net transfer, with \(\sum_S x_i = \sum_D y_j\).

Supplier \(i\) (demander \(j\)) has single-peaked preferences over her net transfer \(x_i\) with peak \(s_i\) (respectively over her net transfer \(y_j\) with peak \(d_j\))\(^8\). We write \(R_i, R_j\) for such preferences\(^9\), and \(\mathcal{R}\) for the set of single peaked preferences over \(\mathbb{R}_+\).

The commodity can only be transferred between certain pairs of supplier \(i\), demander \(j\). The bipartite graph \(G\), a subset of \(S \times D\), represents these constraints: \(ij \in G\) means that a transfer is possible between \(i \in S\) and

\(^8\)For every \(s'_i, s''_i\) we have \(s'_i < s''_i \leq s_i \Rightarrow s''_i \mathbin{P_i} s'_i\), and \(s_i \leq s''_i < s'_i \Rightarrow s''_i \mathbin{P_i} s'_i\).

\(^9\)Note that because a supplier is normally endowed with a finite amount of the commodity, her net trade cannot be arbitrarily large, and similarly the net trade of a demander should be capped. This however will not matter since all relevant net trades will take place in the intervals \([0, s_i]\) and \([0, d_j]\).
$j \in D$. We assume throughout that the graph $G$ is connected, else we can treat each connected component of $G$ as a separate problem.

We use the following notation. For any subsets $T \subseteq S$, $C \subseteq D$ the restriction of $G$ is $G(T,C) = G \cap \{T \times C\}$ (not necessarily connected). The set of demanders compatible with the suppliers in $T$ is $f(T) = \{j \in D| G(T, \{j\}) \neq \emptyset\}$. The set of suppliers compatible with the demanders in $C$ is $g(C) = \{i \in S| G(\{i\}, C) \neq \emptyset\}$.

A transfer of goods from $S$ to $D$ is realized by a $G$-flow $\varphi$, i.e., a vector $\varphi \in \mathbb{R}^G_+$ such that $\varphi_{ij} > 0 \Rightarrow ij \in G$. We write $(x(\varphi), y(\varphi))$ for the transfers implemented by $\varphi$, namely:

\begin{align*}
\text{for all } i \in S : x_i(\varphi) = \sum_{j \in f(i)} \varphi_{ij}; \text{ for all } j \in D : y_j = \sum_{i \in g(j)} \varphi_{ij} \quad (1)
\end{align*}

We say that the net transfers $(x, y)$ are feasible if they are implemented by some $G$-flow. We write $\mathcal{A}(G)$ for the set of feasible net transfers, and define similarly $\mathcal{A}(G(T, C))$ for any $T \subseteq S$, $C \subseteq D$. These sets are described in our first result.

**Lemma 1:** For any $S' \subseteq S$, $D' \subseteq D$ the three following statements are equivalent:

i) $(x, y) \in \mathcal{A}(G(S', D'))$

ii) for all $T \subseteq S'$, $x_T \leq y_{f(T)}$ and $x_{S'} = y_{D'}$

iii) for all $C \subseteq D'$, $y_C \leq x_{g(C)}$ and $y_{D'} = x_{S'}$

**Proof:** This is a standard application of the Marriage Lemma\(^\text{10}\).

For a given profile of preferences $R \in \mathcal{P}^{S \cup D}$, we speak of the economy $(S, D, G, R)$ or simply $(G, R)$ when this causes no confusion. All our results in the next two sections, as well as the definition of our solution, only depend upon the profile of peaks $s, d$, and not upon the full preference profile $R$. To signal such simplification, we will speak of a problem $(S, D, G, s, d)$ or simply $(G, s, d)$.

### 3 Pareto optimality

We write $\mathcal{P}(G, R)$ for the set of Pareto optimal net transfers: it contains the feasible net transfer $(x, y)$ if and only if for any other $(x', y') \in \mathcal{A}(G)$ we have

\begin{align*}
\{\text{for all } i, j: x_i' R_i x_i \text{ and } y_j R_j y_j\} \Rightarrow \{\text{for all } i, j: x_i' I_i x_i \text{ and } y_j' I_j y_j\}
\end{align*}

\(^\text{10}\)See Ahuja et al. (1993)
To describe Pareto optimal allocations, we use a variant of the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition for bipartite graphs. This result depends upon the problem \((G, s, d)\) and not on the aspects of preferences other than peaks.

When we speak of the (sub)problem \((G(S', D'), s, d)\), we mean that the suppliers in \(S'\) will be transferring goods to the agents in \(D'\) along \(G(S', D')\), so that only the \(S'\) and the \(D'\) coordinates of \(s, d\) matter.

**Definition** We say that the problem \((G(S', D'), s, d)\) is balanced if \((s, d) \in A(G(S', D')).\)

ii) has short-supply if for all \(T \subseteq S'\), \(s_T < d_f(T)\).

iii) has short-demand if for all \(C \subseteq D'\), \(d_C < s_g(C)\).

In a balanced problem the net transfer \((s, d)\) is feasible; in a problem with short-demand some net transfers \((d, y)\) with \(y \leq s\) are feasible (Lemma 1); in a problem with short-supply some net transfers \((x, s)\) with \(x \leq d\) are feasible (Lemma 1).

The next result says that any allocation problem \((G, s, d)\) can be decomposed in three subproblems, one of each type.

**Lemma 2:** For any problem \((G, s, d)\) where \(G\) is connected, and \(s, d \geq 0\), there exists unique partitions \(S_+, S_0, S_-\) of \(S\), and \(D_+, D_0, D_-\) of \(D\) such that

i) \(G(S_-, D_0) = G(S_-, D_-) = G(S_0, D_-) = \emptyset\)

ii) \((G(S_0, D_0), s, d)\) is balanced;

iii) \((G(S_+, D_-), s, d)\) has short-supply

iv) \((G(S_-, D_+), s, d)\) has short-demand.

There are algorithms polynomial in the number of nodes \(|S| + |D|\) to compute the GE decomposition (see Ore, 1962).

Note that up to two of the pairs \((S_0, D_0), (S_+, D_-),\) or \((S_-, D_+)\) may be empty. One example is given in figure 2 section 1. Another one is when there are no feasibility constraints: \(G = S \times D\). As in footnote 7 section 1, we have: if \(s_S < d_D\) then \(S = S_+, D = D_-\); if \(d_D < s_S\) then \(S = S_-, D = D_+\); if \(s_S = d_D\) then \(S = S_0, D = D_0\).

**Proof:** The Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of a bipartite graph (Ore 1962), gives precisely the statements when for all \(i \in S\), \(s_i = 1\) and for all \(j \in D\), \(d_j = 1\). When for each \(i \in S\), \(s_i\) is a positive integer, we make \(s_i\) copies of agent \(i\). Similarly, when for each \(j \in D\), \(d_j\) is a positive integer, we make \(d_j\) copies of agent \(j\).

Then we connect all copies of agents \(i\) to all copies of \(j\) if and only if \(ij \in G\). Again the statements follow by the GE decomposition of this new bipartite graph. By a common rescaling of \(s, d\), we cover the case where these
numbers are rational and positive, and by a straightforward limit argument that of real numbers as well, including possibly zero for some peaks.

For future reference (proof of Proposition 4, step 2) we note that the elements of the partition can be defined as the solutions of simple maximization problems.

Define $L = \arg \max_{T \subseteq S} \{ s_T - d_{f(T)} \}$ if there is at least one $T$ such that $s_T > d_{f(T)}$, $L = \emptyset$ else. As $T \mapsto s_T - d_{f(T)}$ is supermodular, $L$ is stable by intersection and union, and $S_-$ is its smallest element, while $S_+ \cup S_0$ is its largest element. Define similarly $M = \arg \max_{C \subseteq D} \{ d_C - s_{g(C)} \}$ if there is at least one $C$ such that $d_C > s_{g(C)}$, $M = \emptyset$ else. Then $M$ is stable by intersection and union, $D_-$ is its smallest element, and $D_- \cup D_0$ its largest element. We omit the straightforward proof.

We give three examples illustrating the decomposition.

**Example 1.** In Figure 1 in Section 1, the partitions are $S_+ = \{2, 3, 4\}$, $S_- = \{1\}$; $D_+ = \{1\}$, $D_- = \{2, 3\}$ (there is no $S_0, D_0$).

**Example 2.** In Figure 2 in Section 1, the partitions are $S_+ = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$, $D_- = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ (there is no $S_-, D_+, S_0, D_0$).

**Example 3.** In the example of Figure 3, the GE decomposition is $D_- = \{d_1\}$, $D_+ = \{d_3, d_4\}$, $D_0 = \{d_2\}$, $S_+ = \{s_1\}$, $S_- = \{s_3, s_4\}$, $S_0 = \{s_2\}$. For another example consider a variant of Figure 4 in which the $d'_2 = 17$ instead.
Figure 4: Decomposition without a balanced subgraph

of 15. This is shown in Figure 4. Now \((S_+, D_-)\) is the upper part of the graph while \((S_-, D_+)\) is the lower part.

Figures 3 and 4 illustrate a general property, an immediate consequence of Lemma 2: for any graph and any pair of suppliers \(i_1, i_2\) such that \(f(i_1) \subset f(i_2)\), we have \(i_2 \in S_- \Rightarrow i_1 \in S_-\) and \(i_1 \in S_+ \Rightarrow i_2 \in S_+\); for any graph and any pair of demanders \(j_1, j_2\) such that \(g(j_1) \subset g(j_2)\), we have \(j_2 \in D_- \Rightarrow j_1 \in D_-\) and \(j_1 \in D_+ \Rightarrow j_2 \in D_+\).

We are now ready to describe the key facts about the set \(\mathcal{PO}(G, R)\) of Pareto optimal transfers. For a vector of transfers \((x, y) \in \mathbb{R}^{S_+} \times \mathbb{R}^{D_+}\), we write its projection on \(\mathbb{R}^{S'} \times \mathbb{R}^{D'}\) as \((x_{[S']}, y_{[D']})\).

**Proposition 1:** In the economy \((G, R)\),

i) if the net transfer \((x, y)\) implemented by the G-flow \(\varphi\) is Pareto optimal, then transfers occur only between \(S_+\) and \(D_-\), \(S_0\) and \(D_0\), \(S_-\) and \(D_+\):

\[
\varphi_{ij} > 0 \Rightarrow (i, j) \in (S_0 \times D_0) \cup (S_+ \times D_-) \cup (S_- \times D_+)
\]

ii) \((x, y) \in \mathcal{PO}(G, R)\) if and only if

\[
\begin{align*}
    x_{[S_0]} &= s_{[S_0]}, & y_{[D_0]} &= d_{[D_0]} \quad \text{(hence } x_{S_0} = y_{D_0}) \\
    x_{[S_+]} &\geq s_{[S_+]}, & y_{[D_-]} &\leq d_{[D_-]} \quad \text{and } x_{S_+} = y_{D_-} \quad \text{(2)} \\
    x_{[S_-]} &\leq s_{[S_-]}, & y_{[D_+]} &\geq d_{[D_+]} \quad \text{and } x_{S_-} = y_{D_+}
\end{align*}
\]
iii) \((x, y) \in \mathcal{PO}(G, R)\) if

\[
x[S_0] = s[S_0], \quad y[D_0] = d[D_0]
\]

(3)

\[
x[S_+] = s[S_+], \quad y[D_-] \leq d[D_-] \quad \text{and} \quad s[S_-] = y[D_-]
\]

\[
x[S_-] \leq s[S_-], \quad y[D_+] = d[D_+] \quad \text{and} \quad x[S_-] = d[D_+]
\]

Proof in the Appendix.

Note that by Lemma 2, in statement iii), the inequalities \(x[S_-] \leq s[S_-]\) and \(y[D_-] \leq d[D_-]\) cannot be all equalities.

We will denote by \(\mathcal{PO}^*(G, s, d)\), the set of allocations described in statement iii): they are Pareto optimal for any choice of preferences with peaks \(s, d\). In the rest of the paper we will only focus on the conditions in 3, as the voluntary trade property, combined with strategyproofness, automatically restricts net transfers to \(\mathcal{PO}^*(G, s, d)\).

4 The egalitarian transfer solution

First we introduce some additional notation. For any finite set \(N\) and any \(z \in \mathbb{R}^N\), \(z^*\) denotes the order statistics of \(z\), obtained by rearranging the coordinates of \(z\) in increasing order: \(z^{*1} \leq z^{*2} \leq \cdots \leq z^{*n}\). Given two \(z, w \in \mathbb{R}^N\), recall that \(z\) Lorenz dominates \(w\), written \(z LD w\), if for all \(k, 1 \leq k \leq n\)

\[
\sum_{a=1}^{k} z^{*a} \geq \sum_{a=1}^{k} w^{*a}
\]

We say that \(z\) is Lorenz dominant in the set \(A\) if \(z LD z'\) for all \(z' \in A\). Lorenz dominance is a partial ordering, so not every set, even convex and compact, admits a Lorenz dominant element. On the other hand, in a convex set \(A\) there can be at most one Lorenz dominant element.

Now we define a family of descending algorithms, one of which define our solution below. These algorithms apply to the two subproblems \((G(S_-, D_+), s, d)\) and \((G(S_+, D_-), s, d)\), and we start by the former. For any \(C \subseteq D_+\) we simply write \(g(C)\) instead of \(g(C) \cap S_-\). Fix a continuous weakly increasing path of net supplies \(\mu \in \mathbb{R}_+ \cup \{\infty\} \rightarrow \gamma(\mu) \in \mathbb{R}^S_+\) such that \(\gamma(0) = 0, \gamma(\infty) = s[S_-]\). The system of inequalities with variable \(\mu\)

\[
\gamma_{g(C)}(\mu) \geq d_C \quad \text{for all } C \subseteq D_-
\]

(4)
hods for $\mu = \infty$, even with strict inequalities because of short demand. In view of $\gamma_{S_-}(0) \leq d_{D_+}$ there is a $\mu^1, 0 \leq \mu^1 < \infty$, that is the smallest $\mu$ such that $(4)$ holds true, equivalently $\mu^1$ is the largest $\mu$ such that one of the inequalities in $(4)$ is tight. As $C \rightarrow \gamma_{g(C)}(\mu^1) - d_C$ is submodular, the equality $\gamma_{g(C)}(\mu^1) = d_C$ is stable by union and intersection\textsuperscript{11} of the sets $C$. We call $C^1$ the largest such subset. By Lemma 1, the allocation $(\gamma_{g(C^1)}(\mu^1), d_{[C^1]})$ is in $\mathcal{A}(g(C^1),C^1)$, i.e. we can give $\gamma(\mu^1)$ to the agents in $C^1$ by using all the resources in $C^1$ and no more. In the restricted problem $(G(S_- \setminus g(C^1), D_+ \setminus C^1), s, d)$ we set $g^1(C) = g(C) \setminus g(C^1)$ for all $C \subseteq D_+ \setminus C^1$. Then $\gamma_{g^1(C)}(\mu^1) \geq d_C$ for all $C \subseteq D_+ \setminus C^1$, because $\gamma_{g^1(C)}(\mu^1) + \gamma_{g(C^1)}(\mu^1) = \gamma_{g(C) \setminus C^1}(\mu^1) \geq d_C + d_{C^1}$. In fact $\gamma_{g^1(C)}(\mu^1) > d_C$ because $\gamma_{g(C)}(\mu^1) = d_C$ would imply that $C \cup C^1$ is tight at $\mu_1$, contradicting the definition of $C^1$. We also have $\gamma_{S_- \setminus g(C^1)}(0) \leq d_{D_+ \setminus C^1}$, so we can repeat the argument above in the restricted problem $(G(S_- \setminus g(C^1), D_+ \setminus C^1), s, d)$ to find the largest number $\mu^2, \mu^2 < \mu^1$, at which one of the inequalities $\gamma_{g^2(C)}(\mu) \geq d_C$ becomes an equality. We call $C^2$ the largest such subset of $D_+ \setminus C^1$. We can achieve the allocation $\gamma_{g^2(C^2)}(\mu^2)$ for the agents in $g(C^2) \setminus g(C^1)$ by using all the resources in $C^2$ and no more. Continuing in this fashion we define a partition $C^1, C^2, \ldots$, of $D_+$, and a strictly decreasing sequence $\mu^1 > \mu^2 > \cdots$, such that the allocation $(\gamma_{g(C^1)}(\mu^1), \gamma_{g(C^2) \setminus g(C^1)}(\mu^2), \cdots)$ is obtained by assigning for all $k$ the resources in $C^k$ to the agents in $g(C^k) \setminus g(C^{k-1}) \cup \cdots \cup g(C^1)$.

The descending algorithm for $G(S_+, D_-)$ are defined similarly by means of a weakly increasing path $\mu \in \mathbb{R}_+ \cup \{\infty\} \rightarrow \delta(\mu) \in \mathbb{R}_+ \setminus \{0\}$ such that $\delta(0) = 0, \delta(\infty) = d_{[D_-]}$.

**Proposition 2:** For any problem $(G, s, d)$, the set $\mathcal{PO}^*(G, s, d)$, contains a Lorenz dominant element $(\overline{x}, \overline{y}) = \mathcal{E}(s, d)$, that we call the egalitarian transfer solution. The allocation $\overline{x}_{[S_-]}$ is obtained by the descending algorithm in $(G(S_-, D_+), s, d)$ along the path

$$\gamma_i(\mu) = \min \{\mu, s_i\} \text{ for all } i \in S_- \tag{5}$$

The allocation $\overline{y}_{[D_-]}$ is obtained by the descending algorithm in $(G(S_+, D_-), s, d)$ along the path

$$\delta_j(\mu) = \min \{\mu, d_j\} \text{ for all } j \in D_- \tag{6}$$

(recall that $\overline{x}_{[S_+]} = s_{[S_+]}$ and $\overline{y}_{[D_+]} = d_{[D_+]}$). Proof in the Appendix.

\textsuperscript{11} Take two such subsets $C, C'$ and compute $\gamma_{g(C) \cap C'}(\mu^1) + \gamma_{g(C) \setminus C'}(\mu^1) \leq \gamma_{g(C)}(\mu^1) + \gamma_{g(C')}(\mu^1) = d_C + d_{C'} = d_{C \cup C'} + d_{C \cap C'}$, where the former inequality comes from $\gamma_{g(C' \cup C)} = g(C \cup C') = g(C) \cup g(C'), g(C \cap C') \subseteq g(C) \cap g(C')$.
**Example 4.** In the absence of bilateral constraints, i.e., if $G = S \times D$, we already noticed, immediately after Lemma 2, that the decomposition reduces to one of the three $(S_-, D_+)$, $(S_+, D_-)$, or $(S_0, D_0)$. Our solution simply applies the uniform rationing method of Sprumont (1991) to the long side of the market. A similar solution is discussed and characterized in Klaus et al. (1998). In their model, agents’ endowments are known and preferences over “consumption” are reported. In our model, agents report their preferences regarding net trades. We do not assume that the planner has any knowledge regarding endowments or preferences.

**Example 5.** In the example of Figure 3, we have $S = S_+, D = D_-$, and the descending algorithm stops at $\mu^1 = 10, \mu^2 = 8, \mu^3 = 5$.

**Example 6.** School assignment

In Figure 5, there are 8 schools in 4 different neighborhoods. In each neighborhood one school is overcrowded and the other is attended below its capacity. Each student can be transferred to a school in the same or an adjacent neighborhood. School $S_1$ has 27 excess students, which can be sent to schools $D_1$ and $D_2$. In the remaining of the graph, the number of excess students is below the vacancies, and schools $D_3$ and $D_4$ absorb all the excess from $S_2$, $S_3$, and $S_4$. The decomposition is $S_- = \{S_1\}$, $D_+ = \{D_1, D_2\}$; $S_+ = \{S_2, S_3, S_4\}$, $D_- = \{D_3, D_4\}$. The egalitarian transfer rule gives

$$(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4) = (25, 5, 10, 15) \text{ and } (y_1, y_2, y_3, y_4) = (10, 15, 20, 10)$$

5 Properties of the egalitarian transfer rule

We discuss now the basic equity and incentive properties leading to the characterization of the egalitarian transfer rule in the next section. Those properties bear on the profile of individual preferences $R$, therefore instead of a problem $(S, D, G, s, d)$, we consider now the economy $(S, D, G, R)$ (or simply $(G, R)$). We use the notation $s[R_i], d[R_j]$ for the peak transfer of supplier $i$ and demander $j$.

**Definition:** Given the agents $(S, D)$, a rule selects for every economy $(G, R) \in 2^{S \times D} \times R^{S \cup D}$ a feasible allocation $\psi(G, R) \in A(G)$.

We define first the link monotonicity property, requiring that an agent on either side of the market cannot be hurt by the access to new links. As discussed in the introduction, this ensures that no agent has an incentive to close a feasible link, revealing all feasible links to the manager is a dominant strategy:
Link monotonicity: A rule \( \psi \) is link monotonic if for any economy \((G, R) \in 2^{S \times D} \times R^{S \cup D}\), and any \( i \in S, j \in D \), we have \( \psi_i(G \cup \{ij\}, R) \leq \psi_i(G, R) \) and \( \psi_j(R, G) \leq \psi_j(R \cup \{ij\}, G) \).

We show below that the egalitarian transfer rule is link monotonic. On the other hand the addition of a link \( ij \) may well hurt other agents than \( i,j \).

In the following example with short demand

\([S_1, S_2 : \text{peak } 5, D_1 : \text{peak } 3, D_2 : \text{peak } 1; \text{links } S_1D_1, S_1D_2, S_2D_2]\)

our rule picks the allocation \( x_1 = 3, x_2 = 1 \), and after the addition of the link \( S_2D_1 \) it gives \( x_1 = x_2 = 2 \).

**Proposition 3:** The egalitarian transfer rule is link-monotonic.

Proof in the Appendix.

In the rest of the section we discuss properties for which the graph \( G \) is fixed, so we write a rule simply as \( \psi(R) \) for \( R \in R^{S \cup D} \). The next incentive property is the familiar strategyproofness. It is useful to decompose it into a monotonicity and an invariance condition.

Monotonicity: A rule \( \psi \) is monotonic if one’s net transfer is weakly increasing in her reported peak: for all \( R \in R^{S \cup D}, i \in S, j \in D \) and \( R'_i, R'_j \in R \) \( s[R'_i] \leq s[R_i] \Rightarrow \psi_i(R'_i, R_{-i}) \leq \psi_i(R) \); and \( d[R'_j] \leq d[R_j] \Rightarrow \psi_j(R'_j, R_{-j}) \leq \psi_j(R) \)

Invariance: A rule \( \psi \) is invariant if for all \( R \in R^{S \cup D}, i \in S, j \in D \) and
\(R'_i, R'_j \in \mathcal{R}\)

\[
s[R_i] < \psi_i(R) \text{ and } s[R'_i] \leq \psi_i(R) \text{ or } \{s[R_i] > \psi_i(R) \text{ and } s[R'_i] \geq \psi_i(R)\}
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \psi_i(R'_i, R_{-i}) = \psi_i(R)
\]

and a similar statement when \(j \in D\) reports \(R'_j \in \mathcal{R}\) with a peak on the same side of \(\psi_j(R)\) as the peak of \(R_j\).

**Strategyproofness:** A rule \(\psi\) is strategyproof if for all \(R \in \mathcal{R}^{S \cup D}\), \(i \in S, j \in D\) and \(R'_i, R'_j \in \mathcal{R}\)

\[
\psi_i(R) \psi_i(R'_i, R_{-i}) \text{ and } \psi_j(R) \psi_j(R'_j, R_{-j})
\]

Each one of monotonicity or invariance implies own-peak-only: my net transfer only depends upon the peak of my preferences, and not on the way I compare transfers across my peak.

The next Lemma connects these three properties and Pareto optimality.

**Lemma 3: Monotonicity and invariance**

i) If a rule is monotonic and invariant, it is strategy-proof;

ii) An efficient and strategyproof rule is monotonic and invariant.

**Proof:** We omit the easy argument proving statement i), just as in the Sprumont (1991) model.

**Statement ii)** Fix an efficient (Pareto optimal) and strategyproof rule \(\psi\), a preference profile \(R \in \mathcal{R}^{S \cup D}\), a supplier \(i \in S\), and an alternative preference \(R'_i \in \mathcal{R}\). We use the notation \(s_i = s[R_i], s'_i = s[R'_i], R' = (R'_i, R_{-i})\), and \((s,d), (s',d)\) are the profiles of peaks at \(R\) and \(R'\) respectively; finally \(x_i = \psi_i(R), x'_i = \psi_i(R')\).

We prove monotonicity for a supplier \(i\) (and omit the entirely similar argument for a demander). Fix such that \(s'_i \leq s_i\). We want to show \(x'_i \leq x_i\). Distinguish two cases.

**Case 1:** \(i \in S_-(s,d)\). Assume first \(s'_i > x_i\). Then the decomposition at \((s',d)\) is unchanged, \(S_-(s,d) = S_-(s',d)\) so by efficiency (Proposition 1) \(x'_i \leq s'_i\). Assume \(x_i < x'_i\); then we have \(x_i < x'_i \leq s'_i \leq s_i\), and we get a contradiction of SP for agent \(i\) at profile \(R\). Assume next \(s'_i \leq x_i\). Then \(x_i < x'_i\) would give \(s'_i \leq x_i < x'_i\), hence a violation of SP for agent \(i\) at \(R'\).

**Case 2:** \(i \in (S_0 \cup S_+) (s,d)\). Then efficiency gives \(s_i \leq x_i\), so \(x_i < x'_i\) would give \(s'_i \leq s_i \leq x_i < x'_i\), hence a violation of SP for agent \(i\) at \(R'\).

We show invariance next, again in the case of a supplier \(i\). Under the premises on the left of property (7), if \(\psi_i(R') > \psi_i(R)\) we have \(s'_i \leq \psi_i(R') < \psi_i(R)\), hence a violation of SP for agent \(i\) at \(R'\). If \(\psi_i(R') < \psi_i(R)\) we can find a preference \(R^*_i\) with peak \(s^*_i = s_i\) such that \(\psi_i(R') P^*_i \psi_i(R)\). Then,
\[ \psi_i(R^*, R_{-i}) = \psi_j(R), \] so agent \( i \) with preferences \( R^*_i \) benefits by reporting \( s'_i \). The proof under the premises on the right of (7) is identical. \[ \blacksquare \]

Proposition 4

The egalitarian transfer rule is monotonic and invariant, hence strategyproof as well.

Proof in the Appendix.

We now turn to equity properties. The familiar equity test of no envy must be adapted to our model because of the feasibility constraints. If supplier 1 envies the net transfer \( x_2 \) of supplier 2, it might not be possible anyway to give him \( x_2 \) because the demanders connected to agent 1 do not allow it. Alternatively, if we can exchange the net transfers of 1 and 2, this typically requires to construct a new flow and alter some of the other agents’ allocations. In either case we submit that agent 1 has no legitimate claim against the allocation \( x \).

An envy argument by agent 1 against agent 2 is legitimate only if it is feasible to improve upon agent 1’s allocation without altering the allocation of anyone other than agent 2.

No envy: Fix \( G \in 2^{S \times D} \). A rule \( \psi \) satisfies no envy if for any preference profile \( R \in R^{S \cup D} \) and any \( i_1, i_2 \in S \) such that \( \psi_{i_2}(R)P_i \psi_{i_1}(R) \), there exists no \((x, y) \in A(G)\) such that

\[ \psi_i(R) = x_i \text{ for all } i \in S \setminus \{i_1, i_2\}; \psi_j(R) = y_j \text{ for all } j \in D \]

and \( x_{i_1}P_i \psi_{i_1}(R) \) and a similar statement where we exchange the role of demanders and suppliers.

Note that if \( i_1, i_2 \) have identical connections, \( i_1j \in G \iff i_2j \in G \), then no envy implies \( \psi_{i_1}(R)P_i \psi_{i_2}(R) \).

The familiar horizontal equity property must be similarly adapted to account for the bilateral constraints on transfers.

Equal treatment of equals: Fix \( G \in 2^{S \times D} \). A rule \( \psi \) satisfies ETE if for any preference profile \( R \in R^{S \cup D} \) and any \( i_1, i_2 \in S \) such that \( s_{i_1}[R_{i_1}] = s_{i_2}[R_{i_2}] \), there exists no \((x, y) \in A(G)\) such that

\[ \psi_i(R) = x_i \text{ for all } i \in S \setminus \{i_1, i_2\}; \psi_j(R) = y_j \text{ for all } j \in D \]

and \( |x_{i_1} - x_{i_2}| < |\psi_{i_1}(R) - \psi_{i_2}(R)| \) and a similar statement where we exchange the role of demanders and suppliers.

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Again, if \( i_1, i_2 \) have identical connections and preferences, ETE implies \( \psi_{i_1}(R) = \psi_{i_2}(R) \).

Our definition of ETE is with regard to net trades. As is well-known this is stronger than a version of ETE stated in terms of preferences such as the one in Ching (1994). While the weaker version is implied by no envy, this is not the case for ETE. However under Pareto optimality, No envy implies ETE as we show below.

**Proposition 5**

i) No envy plus Pareto optimality imply equal treatment of equals;

ii) The egalitarian rule \( \mathcal{E} \) satisfies no envy.

**Proof:** Statement i). Suppose the rule \( \psi \) violates ETE and check it violates no envy and/or Pareto optimality. Fix a profile \( R \) and two suppliers 1, 2 such that \( s_1[R_1] = s_2[R_2] = s^* \), and there exists \((x, y)\) satisfying (9). Assume without loss \( \psi_1(R) < \psi_2(R) \). Note that \( x_1 + x_2 = \psi_1(R) + \psi_2(R) \) so only two cases are possible: \( \psi_1(R) < x_1 < x_2 < \psi_2(R) \), or \( \psi_1(R) < x_2 \leq x_1 < \psi_2(R) \).

Assume the first case. If \( s^* \geq \psi_2(R) \), supplier 1 envies 2 via \((x, y)\); similarly \( s^* \leq \psi_1(R) \) yields a violation of no envy. If \( x_1 < s^* < x_2 \), the profile of transfers \((x, y)\) is Pareto superior to \( \psi(R) \) (for both agents). If \( x_2 \leq s^* < \psi_2(R) \), the profile \((x', y)\), \( x'_2 = s^*, x'_1 = x_1 + x_2 - s^* \), \( x'_k = x_k \) else, is a convex combination of \((x, y)\) and \( \psi(R) \), so it is feasible (\( \mathcal{A}(G) \) is convex), and Pareto superior to \( \psi(R) \) (for both agents). The case \( \psi_1(R) < s^* \leq x_1 \) leads to a similar violation of PO.

In the second case, observe that the profile \((x', y)\), \( x'_1 = x'_2 = \frac{1}{2}(x_1 + x_2) \), \( x'_k = x_k \) else, is a convex combination of \((x, y)\) and \( \psi(R) \), so it is feasible and we are back to case 1.

Statement ii) Let \( \psi \) be the egalitarian rule, and \( R \) be a profile at which supplier 1 envies supplier 2 via \((x, y)\). From \( x_1 + x_2 = \mathcal{E}_1(R) + \mathcal{E}_2(R) \) and the fact that \( \mathcal{E}(R) \) Lorenz dominates \( x \) we must have \(|x_1 - x_2| > |\mathcal{E}_2(R) - \mathcal{E}_1(R)| \geq 0 \). If \( x_1 - x_2 \) and \( \mathcal{E}_2(R) - \mathcal{E}_1(R) \) have the same sign, then we have \( x_1 < \mathcal{E}_1(R) < \mathcal{E}_2(R) < x_2 \) (or a symmetric condition by exchanging 1 and 2).

Now \( \mathcal{E}_2(R) P_1 \mathcal{E}_1(R) \) implies \( s[R_1] > \mathcal{E}_1(R) \), hence \( \mathcal{E}_1(R) P_1 x_1 \), contradiction. If \( x_1 - x_2 \) and \( \mathcal{E}_2(R) - \mathcal{E}_1(R) \) have opposite signs, convexity of \( \mathcal{A}(G) \) implies that \((x', y)\), \( x'_1 = x'_2 = \frac{1}{2}(x_1 + x_2) \), \( x'_k = \mathcal{E}_k(R) \) else, is feasible. So \((x', y)\) Lorenz dominates \( \mathcal{E}(R) \), a contradiction. \( \blacksquare \)

6 Characterization result

Our last axiom is a basic incentive property stating that each agent is entitled to keep her endowment of the commodity and refuse to trade.
Voluntary trade: Fix $G \in 2^{S \times D}$. A rule $\psi$ guarantees voluntary trade if for all $R \in R^{S \cup D}$, $i \in S \cup D$, we have $\psi_i(R) \geq 0$.

Note that link monotonicity implies voluntary trade.

**Theorem:** The egalitarian transfer rule $\mathcal{E}$ is characterized by Pareto optimality, strategyproofness, voluntary trade, and equal treatment of equals.

Proof in the Appendix.

7 Concluding comments

**Summary:** Our model generalizes to a considerable extent the standard one-sided division model introduced by Sprumont (1991) and its two-sided version considered by Klaus et al. (1998). This extension generates several hurdles because of additional feasibility constraints imposed by the bipartite graph. The division of the graph in three submarkets in which there is excess supply, balancedness, and excess demand respectively, gives the structure of the Pareto optimal allocations. Then the feasibility constraints are captured by a system of submodular upper bounds on coalitional shares in the excess supply segment of the market, and a system of supermodular lower bounds in the excess demand segment. Finally equal treatment of equals must be restricted to those equalizing transfers that do not affect the shares of agents not involved in the transfer. After those new features are properly incorporated, our egalitarian transfer solution is characterized by the combination of efficiency, strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals. We conjecture that the egalitarian transfer solution is also robust against coordinated misreport of preferences by any subgroups of agents, i.e. the solution is group strategyproof.

**Companion paper:** In Bochet et al. (2009) we study the generalization of Sprumont’s model to arbitrary bipartite graphs. The suppliers are now passive, they must unload a given amount of the commodity among the set of receivers, who each have a private ideal consumption level. Thus the receivers may have to consume more or less than their peak. This one-sided model is simpler, on the other hand we endow each receiver with some capacity constraints (from above and below), which complicates the analysis.

To describe the set of Pareto optimal allocations, we use the same decomposition as in Lemma 2, but its interpretation is different. Receivers in $D_-$ absorb only the resources of $S_+$, and end up consuming less than their peak, while those in $D_+$ absorb all resources in $S_-$, and end up consuming more than their peak.
We characterize a rule similar to the egalitarian transfer rule by means of efficiency, strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals.

Extensions: First, following Sasaki (1997), Ehlers and Klaus (2003) for the division model under single peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991), we can think of a “discrete” variant where indivisible units have to be traded between sellers and demanders. Both papers above offer a characterization of the randomized uniform rule, and it is likely that their result can be adapted to our model with bilateral constraints. Second, we have considered here only rules which treat agents as symmetrically as possible given the bilateral constraints. But exogenous priority rights may apply to agents on the long side of the market (those who are rationed), in which case we want to understand what incentive compatible rules respect these constraints.

In the one-sided fair division model of Sprumont (1991), the rich family of allotment rules (Barbera, Jackson and Neme, 1997) preserves the incentive properties of the egalitarian rule while allowing a very different treatment of the agents. Similarly the family of fixed paths rules (Moulin, 1999) is characterized by the combination of efficiency, strategyproofness, resource monotonicity and consistency. Further research questions include extending both families to our model.

References


8 Appendix: proofs

8.1 Proposition 1

Statement (i) We fix \((x, y) \in PC(G, R)\) and a \(G\)-flow \(\varphi\) implementing \((x, y)\) (1)). To show that condition \(i)\) is satisfied we proceed in 2 steps.
Step (i).1 We show
\[
ij \in G(S_+, D_0 \cup D_+) \Rightarrow \varphi_{ij} = 0
\] (10)

The proof is by contradiction. Pick \(i^*j^* \in G(S_+, D_0 \cup D_+)\) such that \(\varphi_{i^*j^*} > 0\). We construct first a transfer path \(i^*j^*, j^*i_1, i_1j_1, j_1i_2, \ldots, j_{K-1}i_K\), entirely in \(G(S_0 \cup S_-, D_0 \cup D_+)\) except for the first edge \(i^*j^*,\) and such that i) \(\varphi_{i_kj_k} > 0\) for every odd edge \(i_kj_k;\) and ii) \(x_{i_k} < s_{i_k}\) or \(y_{j_{K-1}} > d_{j_{K-1}}\). Note that if \(y_{j_{K-1}} > d_{j_{K-1}}\), then the last edge \(j_{K-1}i_K\) is even and \(i_K\) can be chosen arbitrarily. Note also that some agents may appear multiple times in the path.

If \(y_{j^*} > d_{j^*}\), the transfer path is simply \(i^*j^*, j^*i_1\) for an arbitrary \(i_1\) in \(S_0 \cup S_-\). Suppose next \(y_{j^*} \leq d_{j^*}\). Then by Lemma 2 the set \(T^1 = g(j^*) \cap (S_0 \cup S_-)\) is non empty: if \(j^* \in D_+\) because \((G(S_-, D_+), s, d)\) has short-demand, and if \(j^* \in D_0\) because \((G(S_0, D_0), s, d)\) is balanced. If there exists \(i_1 \in T^1\) such that \(x_{i_1} < s_{i_1}\), then the transfer path ends with \(i_1\).

Assume for all \(i_1 \in T^1\), \(x_{i_1} \geq s_{i_1}\), and observe from Lemma 2 that \(d_{j^*} \leq s_{T^1}\). Combining this with \(y_{j^*} \leq d_{j^*}\) and \(x_{T^1} \geq s_{T^1}\), and with the fact that some of the net transfer of agent \(j^*\) comes from \(i^*\), outside \(S_0 \cup S_-\), we see that some of the net transfer of coalition \(T^1\) goes to other agents than \(j^*\). By statement i) in Lemma 2, these agents are in \(D_0 \cup D_+\), hence there exists \(i_1 \in T^1\) and \(j_1 \in (D_0 \cup D_+) \setminus \{j^*\}\) such that \(\varphi_{i_1j_1} > 0\). If \(j_1\) can be chosen such that \(y_{j_1} > d_{j_1}\), then the transfer path ends with \(i_1j_1j_2\), where \(i_2\) is arbitrary in \(S_0 \cup S_-\). Otherwise we have \(y_{j_1} \leq d_{j_1}\), and we consider

\[
T^2 = g(\{j^*, j_1\}) \cap (S_0 \cup S_-)
\]

If there exists \(i_2 \in T^2\) such that \(x_{i_2} < s_{i_2}\), then our transfer path will end at \(i_2\). Else for all \(i_2 \in T^2\), \(x_{i_2} \geq s_{i_2}\). Then we have

\[
y_{j^*} + y_{j_1} \leq d_{j^*} + d_{j_1} \leq s_{T^2} \leq x_{T^2}
\]

(And the second inequality comes from Lemma 2) Some of the net transfer of \(\{j^*, j_1\}\) comes from outside \(S_0 \cup S_-\), hence there exists \(i_2 \in T^2\) and \(j_2 \in (D_0 \cup D_+) \setminus \{j^*, j_1\}\) such that \(\varphi_{i_2j_2} > 0\). Repeating this construction, after finitely many steps we must reach an \(i_K\) such that \(x_{i_K} < s_{i_K}\), or \(j_{K-1}\) such that \(y_{j_{K-1}} > d_{j_{K-1}}\).

With our transfer path in hand, we now look for a Pareto improvement of \((x, y)\). This is easy if \(x_{i^*} > s_{i^*}\), because we can reduce the net transfer of \(i^*\) by a small amount, and at the same time increase supplier \(i_K\)’s transfer, or decrease demander \(j_{K-1}\)’s transfer, without changing that of any other agent (along or outside the path). We simply take away an \(\varepsilon\)-transfer between \(i^*j^*\), and add it to the (possibly nil) transfer between \(j^*i_1\), then take it away from \(i_1j_1\), add it to \(j_1i_2\), \ldots, until we finally either take it away from \(i_{K-1}j_{K-1}\)
(if $y_{jk-1} > d_{jk-1}$) or add it to $j_{K-1}i_K$ (if $x_{i_K} < s_{i_K}$). Of course $\varepsilon$ must be smaller than the flow on any odd edge. Thus we have a contradiction.

Assume now $x_i \leq s_i$. Then we construct a second transfer path $i^*j_1^*, i_1^*j_2^*, \ldots, j_{l-1}^*j_l^*$, entirely in $G(S_+, D_-)$ such that i) $\varphi_{j_1^*} > 0$ for every even edge $j_1^*$, and ii) $x_{i^*} > s_{i^*}$ or $y_{j_l^*} < d_{j_l^*}$. The argument is similar to the one above: because $(G(S_+, D_-), s, d)$ has short-supply, the set $C^1 = f(i^*) \cap D_-$ is non-empty; if it contains $j_1^*$ such that $y_{j_1^*} < d_{j_1^*}$, the path stops at $j_1^*$ where $i^*$ is arbitrary; else we have $y_{C_1} \geq d_{C_1}$, that we combine with $s_{i^*} < d_{C_1}$ ($G(S_+, D_-), s, d$ has short supply) and $x_{i^*} \leq s_i$. deduce $x_{i^*} < y_{C_1}$, hence some of the net transfer of $C^1$ comes from other suppliers than $i^*$ and we can find $j_1^* \in C^1, i_1^* \in S_+ \setminus \{i^*\}$ such that $\varphi_{j_1^*} > 0$; if $i^*$ can be chosen such that $x_{i^*} > s_{i^*}$, the path ends right there, otherwise we consider $C^2 = f(\{(i^*, j_1^*)\}) \cap D_-$ and so on.

We observe now that the concatenation of the two transfer paths leads to a Pareto improvement, thus concluding the proof of Step (i).1. If in the first transfer path $x_{i_K} < s_{i_K}$ and in the second $x_{i^*} > s_{i^*}$, we transfer some $\varepsilon$-transfer from $i_K$ to $i^*$: we take $\varepsilon$ away from $\varphi_{j_1^*}$, add it to $\varphi_{i^*} - j_1^*$, and so on, until we take $\varepsilon$ away from $\varphi_{i^*}$, and continue as above until we reach $i_K$. Similarly if $y_{jk-1} > d_{jk-1}$ and $x_{i^*} > s_{i^*}$, we take $\varepsilon$ away from all odd edges in the path $i_{1}^*, j_{1}^*, i_{2}^*, j_{2}^*, \ldots, j_{l-1}^*, i_{l}^*, j_{l}^*$, so the net transfer of both $i_{l}^*$ and $j_{l}^*$ decrease. The argument is similar when $y_{j_{l}^*} < d_{j_{l}^*}$. Step (i).2

$$ij \in G(S_+ \cup S_0, D_+) \Rightarrow \varphi_{ij} = 0$$

The proof, mimics that of Step (i).1, hence is omitted.

**Statement (ii)** We fix $(x, y) \in \mathcal{PO}(G, R)$ and a $G$-flow $\varphi$ implementing $(x, y)$. From statement i) the agents in $D_+$ receive all their commodities from $D_-$ and nothing else, hence $y_{D_+} = x_{S_+}$. Those in $D_-$ get all their commodities from $S_+$ and nothing else, so $y_{D_0} = x_{S_+}$. Thus the commodities in $S_0$ go to agents in $D_0$: as $(G(S_0, D_0), s, d)$ is balanced, Pareto optimality requires each of these agents to obtain exactly their peak share. We show next $x_{[S_+]} \geq s_{[S_+]}$ and $y_{[D_-]} \leq d_{[D_-]}$, using once again a "transfer path" argument.

Suppose $i_1 \in S_+$ is such that $x_{i_1} < s_{i_1}$. We construct a path $i_1j_{1}, j_{1}i_{2}, \ldots, j_{K-1}j_{K},$ entirely in $G(S_+, D_-)$ such that i) $\varphi_{i_1j_{k}} > 0$ for every even edge $j_{k}$, and ii) $x_{i_K} > s_{i_K}$ or $y_{j_{K-1}} < d_{j_{K-1}}$. This will allow to either transfer an $\varepsilon$-net transfer from $i_K$ to $i_1$, or to reduce by $\varepsilon$ the net transfers of $i_1$ and $j_{K-1}$, the desired contradiction. The construction of the path parallels that of the second transfer path in Step (i) 1. The set
$C^1 = f(i_1) \cap D_-$ is non empty; if it contains $j_1$ such that $y_{j_1} < d_{j_1}$, the path stops at $i_1j_1j_1i_2$ where $i_2$ is arbitrary; else we have $y_{C^1} \geq d_{C^1}$, that we combine with $x_{i_1} < s_{i_1} < d_{C^1}$ to deduce that some demander $j_1 \in C^1$ gets some positive net transfer from a supplier $i_2$ different than $i_1$: $\varphi_{i_2j_1} > 0$ and $i_2 \in S_+$. If $x_{i_2} > s_{i_2}$ the path stops there, otherwise we consider $C^2 = f(i_1, i_2) \cap D_-$, for which we have $x_{i_1} + x_{i_2} < s_{i_1} + s_{i_2} < d_{C^2}$, and so on. This proves $x|[S_+| \geq s|S_+|$.

Next we suppose $j_1 \in D_-$ is such that $y_{j_1} > d_{j_1}$. We construct a transfer path $j_1i_1, i_1j_2, \ldots, j_2i_K$, entirely in $G(S_+, D_-)$ and such that $i) \varphi_{i_1i_K} > 0$ for every odd edge $j_i i_k$; and $ii)$ $x_{i_1k} > s_{i_1k}$ or $y_{i_1k-1} < d_{i_1k-1}$. This will allow a Pareto improving transfer in the usual way. To build the first edge of the path, consider the non empty set $T^1 = \{i \in S_+| \varphi_{ij_1} > 0\}$. If it contains $i_1$ such that $x_{i_1} > s_{i_1}$ we can stop. Otherwise we have $x|T^1| \leq s|T^1|$, but we just proved $x|[S_+| \geq s|S_+|$ so $x|T^1| = s|T^1|$; moreover $x|T^1| = y_{j_1}$ by definition of $T^1$, so using the fact that $(G(S_+, D_-), s, d)$ has short supply we have $d_{j_1} < y_{j_1} = s_{T^1} < d_{f(T^1)}$, and we conclude that $f(T^1) \setminus j_1$ is non empty. Take an arbitrary $j_2$ in that set and a corresponding $i_1 \in T^1$ such that $i_1j_2 \in G$. If $y_{j_2} < d_{j_2}$ our path is $j_1i_1, i_1j_2, j_2i_2$ with an arbitrary $i_2$, else $y_{j_2} \geq d_{j_2}$ and we consider $T^2 = \{i \in S_+| \varphi_{ij_1} + \varphi_{ij_2} > 0\}$, the set of suppliers with a positive flow to $j_1$ or to $j_2$ or both. If $T^2$ contains $i_2$ such that $x_{i_2} > s_{i_2}$, our path stops at $i_2$. Otherwise we have $x|T^2| = s|T^2|$ and $x|T^2| = y_{j_1} + y_{j_2}$, so

$$d_{j_1} + d_{j_2} < y_{j_1} + y_{j_2} = s_{T^2} < d_{f(T^2)}$$

hence $f(T^1) \setminus \{j_1, j_2\}$ is non empty. And so on. The proof of "only if" statement is complete.

Suppose now that an allocation $(x, y)$ defined in (2) is Pareto dominated by some $(x', y') \in A(G)$. As each supplier in $S_+$ gets at least her peak transfer at $x$, then at $x'$, by Pareto optimality $x|S_+| \geq x'|S_+|$. Similarly, as each demander in $D_-$ gets at most her peak transfer at $y$, then at $y'$, by Pareto optimality $y|D_-| \leq y'|D_-|$. Suppose $x|S_+| \geq x'|S_+|$. Because $D_-$ can only receive commodity from $S_+$ we have $y|D_-| \leq x'|_{S_+} = x_{S_+} = y|D_-|$. This is a contradiction with $y|D_-| \leq y'|D_-|$. Hence, $x|S_+| = x'|S_+|$. Using a symmetric argument, we can show that $y|D_-| \leq y'|D_-|$. The similar argument for $y'|D_+| = y|D_+|$ and $x'|S_-| = x|S_-|$ is omitted.
8.2 Proposition 2

The descending algorithms along the paths (5),(6), define the Lorenz dominant element in \( \PO^*(G, s, d) \).

Proposition 1 says that an allocation \((x, y)\) is in \( \PO^*(G, s, d) \) if and only if it coincides with \((s, d)\) in \( S_0 \times D_0 \), and its projections on \( S_- \times D_+ \) and \( S_+ \times D_- \) satisfy

\[(x_{[S_-]}, d_{[D_+]}) \in A(G(S_-, D_+)), \quad \text{and} \quad (s_{[S_+]}, y_{[D_-]}) \in A(G(S_+, D_-))\]

To prove that \((x, y)\) defined by the two algorithms (5),(6) is Lorenz dominant in \( \PO^*(G, s, d) \), it is therefore enough to show that \( x_{[S_-]} \) is Lorenz optimal in \( \PO^*(G(S_-, D_+), s, d) = \{(x_{[S_-]}, d_{[D_+]}) | x_{[S_-]} \leq s_{[S_-]} \} \cap A(G(S_-, D_+)) \) and, \( y_{[D_-]} \) is Lorenz dominant in \( \PO^*(G(S_+, D_-), s, d) \). We prove the former and omit the similar argument for the latter.

We write the suppliers' net transfers in \( \PO^*(G(S_-, D_+), s, d) \) simply as \( x \), instead of \( x_{[S_-]} \), and \( \bar{x} \) for the allocation defined by the algorithm (5). Recall that the definition of \( \bar{x} \) involves two parallel partitions of \( D_+ \) and \( S_- : D_+ = C^1 \cup \cdots \cup C^k \cup \cdots, \) and \( S_- = T^1 \cup \cdots \cup T^k \cup \cdots, \) where \( T^k = g(C^k) \setminus g(C^1 \cup \cdots \cup C^{k-1}) \), and in \( \bar{x} \) the demanders in \( C^k \) receive transfers only from the suppliers in \( T^k \), and those transfers are optimal for the demanders. Moreover the net transfer of supplier \( i \in T^k \) is \( \bar{x}_i = \min\{\mu^k, s_i\} \).

We further partition \( T^k \) as follows

\[A^1 = \{i \in T^k | \bar{x}_i < s_i \Leftrightarrow \mu^k < s_i\}; \quad B^k = \{i \in T^k | \bar{x}_i = s_i \Leftrightarrow \mu^k \geq s_i\}\]

The set \( A^1 \) is non empty because \( \bar{x}_{T^1} = \gamma_{T^1}(\mu^1) = d_{C^1} < s_{T^1} \). The set \( A^2 \) is non empty because

\[s_{T^2} \geq \gamma_{T^2}(\mu^1) > d_{C^2} = \gamma_{T^2}(\mu^2)\]

where the strict inequality is explained in the definition of the ascending algorithm.

Repeating this argument shows that \( A^k \neq \emptyset \) for all \( k \). Next we label the agents in \( S_- \) as \( \{1, \cdots, |S_-|\} \) in such a way that the sequence \( \bar{x}_i \) is weakly decreasing, moreover we choose the labeling so that

- the first \(|A_1|\) terms cover \( A^1 \)
- the next terms cover a possibly empty subset \( \tilde{B}^1 \) of \( B^1 \)
- the next \(|A^2|\) terms cover \( A^2 \)
the next terms cover a possibly empty subset $\tilde{B}^2$ of $B^1 \cup B^2$

and so on. This is possible because in $A^k$ everyone gets $\mu^k$ and the sequence $\mu^k$ decreases strictly. Before $A^k$ we cannot have any coordinate in $B^{k'}$, $k' \geq k$, because such an agent receives no more than $\mu^k$.

We fix now an arbitrary $(x, d_{|D_+|}) \in \mathcal{P}\mathcal{O}^*(G(S_-, D_+), s, d)$ and check that $x$ is Lorenz dominated by $\pi$. We use the notation $x^*_x(i) = \sum_{j=|S_-|}^{|S_-|-i+1} x^*_x j$, so that $x_T \leq x^*([T])$ for all $T$. If $T \subset S_-$ is such that $x_T = x^*([T])$ we say that $T$ is an $x$-tail. From our labeling of $S_-$, any subset $\{\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_t\}$ is an $\pi$-tail. We want to prove $x^*(t) \geq \pi^*(t)$ for all $t = 1, \ldots, |S_-|$.

By feasibility $x_T \geq d_{C_1} = \pi_{T^1}$ and by Pareto optimality $x \leq \pi$ in $\tilde{B}^1$. Therefore $x_T \geq \pi_T$ for all $T \subseteq T^1$ such that $T^1 \setminus T \subseteq \tilde{B}^1$. In particular

$$x_T \geq \pi_T \text{ for all } T, A^1 \subseteq T \subseteq A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1 \quad (11)$$

If the above $T$ is an $\pi$-tail (i.e., if $T \setminus A^1$ contains the largest elements of $\tilde{B}^1$), we have $\pi^*([T]) \leq x_T \leq x^*([T])$. Next we note that $x^*(t)$ decreases weakly in $t$, so that for $t \leq |A_1|$ we have

$$\frac{x^*(t)}{t} \geq \frac{x^*([A_1])}{|A_1|} \geq \frac{x(A_1)}{|A_1|} \geq \frac{\pi(A_1)}{|A_1|} = \frac{\pi^*(t)}{t}$$

where the equality is because $\pi$ is egalitarian in $A^1$. We have proved the desired inequality $x^*(t) \leq \pi^*(t)$ up to $t = |A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1|$.

Next consider $T^2$: feasibility implies $x_{T^1 \cup T^2} \geq d_{C_1 \cup C_2} = \pi_{T^1 \cup T^2}$ and Pareto optimality gives $x \leq \pi$ in $B^1 \cup B^2$. Therefore

$$x_T \geq \pi_T \text{ for all } T, A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1 \cup A^2 \subseteq T \subseteq A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1 \cup A^2 \cup \tilde{B}^2 \quad (12)$$

Again if we choose for $T$ an $\pi$-tail, the inequality $x^*(t) \geq \pi^*(t)$ follows at once for $|A^1 \cup B^1 \cup A^2| \geq t \geq |A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1 \cup A^2 \cup \tilde{B}^2|$. If $t$ is such that $t = |A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1| + a \geq |A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1 \cup A^2|$, we pick an $\pi$-tail $T, A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1 \subset T \subset A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1 \cup A^2$, with $|T| = t$. Because $\pi$ is egalitarian in $A^2$, we have

$$\pi^*(t) = \pi_{A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1} + \frac{a}{|A^2|} \pi_{A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1} = (1 - \frac{a}{|A^2|}) \pi_{A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1} + \frac{a}{|A^2|} \pi_{A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1 \cup A^2}$$

We claim

$$x^*(t) \geq x_{A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1} + \frac{a}{|A^2|} \pi_{A^2} = (1 - \frac{a}{|A^2|}) x_{A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1} + \frac{a}{|A^2|} x_{A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1 \cup A^2} \quad (13)$$

which will imply $x^*(t) \geq \pi^*(t)$ because $x_T \geq \pi_T$ is true both for $A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1$ and $A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1 \cup A^2$. 26
The proof is by contradiction. Let

\[ x^*(|X| + |Y|) \geq x_X + \frac{|Y|}{|Y| + |Z|} x_{Y \cup Z} \]

Indeed \( \frac{|Y|}{|Y| + |Z|} x_{Y \cup Z} \) is no more than the sum of the \(|Y|\) largest terms in \( x_{Y \cup Z} \), and \( x_X \) is no more than the sum of the \(|X|\) largest terms in \( x_{|X|} \).

Applying this inequality to \( X = A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1 \), \( Y = T \setminus (A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1) \) and \( Z = (A^1 \cup \tilde{B}^1 \cup A^2) \setminus T \) gives (13).

8.3 Proposition 3

The egalitarian transfer rule is link-monotonic.

Proof: For the economy \((G, R)\), let \( i^* \in S, j^* \in D \) be such that \( i^* j^* \notin G \). Let \( G' \) be the graph derived from \( G \) by adding the link \( i^* j^* \). We will show that \( E_{i^*}(R, G') R_{i^*} E_{j^*}(R, G) \) and \( E_{j^*}(R, G') R_{i^*} E_{j^*}(R, G) \).

Let \( S_+, S_0, S_- \) be the partition of \( S \) and \( D_+, D_0, D_- \) of \( D \) given by the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of \( G \). Similarly, let \( S'_+, S'_0, S'_- \) be the partition of \( S \) and \( D'_+, D'_0, D'_- \) of \( D \) given by the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of \( G' \).

If \( i^* \in S_+ \cup S_0 \) and \( j^* \in D_+ \cup D_0 \), then \( E(R, G) = E(R, G') \). So assume \( i^* \in S_- \).

Case 1: \( j^* \in D_+ \)

In graph \( G \) the suppliers in \( S_- \) have links only with \( D_+ \). The Gallai-Edmonds decompositions in \( G \) and \( G' \) are identical. In \( G' \), the egalitarian transfer rule will give the same allocations inside \((S_, D_-)\) and \((S_0, D_0)\) as in \( G \). For this case, we can focus our attention to \((S_, D_+)\).

Lemma 4: Given \( B \subseteq S_- \) and \( A \subseteq D_+ \) such that \( g(A) = B \), if there exists \( \mu \geq 0 \) such that it is possible achieve a transfer of at least \( \min\{\mu, s_i\} \) for all \( i \in B \) while satisfying the peaks of the agents in \( A \), then in any Lorenz Optimal Pareto allocation \((x, y)\) where the agents in \( A \) receive their peaks, \( x_i \geq \min\{\mu, s_i\} \) for all \( i \in B \).

Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Let \( i^* \in B \), such that \( x_{i^*} < \min\{\mu, s_{i^*}\} \). Let \( \varphi \) be the \( G \)-flow implementing the allocation \((x, y)\).

We construct a transfer path \( i^* j_1, j_1 j_2, j_2 j_3, \ldots, j_K i_K \), entirely in \( G(B, A) \) such that i) \( \varphi_{i_k j_k} > 0 \) for every even edge \( i_k j_k \); and ii) \( x_{i_k} > \min\{\mu, s_{i_k}\} \).

Set \( A^1 = f(i^*) \). Since it was possible to allocate at least \( \min\{\mu, s_{i^*}\} \) to \( i^* \) the set \( B^1 = \{i_1 \in B \setminus \{i^*\} : \varphi_{i_1 j} > 0 \text{ for some } j \in A^1 \} \) is non-empty.
If there exists $i_1 \in B^1$ such that $x_{i_1} > \min\{\mu, s_{i_1}\}$, then the path stops at $j_1i_1$. Otherwise, let $A^2 = f(B^1)$ and consider the set $B^2 = \{i_2 \in B \setminus B^1 \cup \{i^*\} : \varphi_{i_2j} > 0 \text{ for some } j \in A^2\}$. If there exists $i_2 \in B^2$ such that $x_{i_2} > \min\{\mu, s_{i_2}\}$, then the path stops at $j_2i_2$. Otherwise, we continue iteratively until we find an $i_K$ such that $x_{i_K} > \min\{\mu, s_{i_K}\}$. Since it is only possible to give at least $x_i > \min\{\mu, s_i\}$ to all $i \in B$, and $x_i < \min\{\mu, s_i\}$, such an $i_K$ exists.

With our transfer path in hand, we now look for a Lorenz or Pareto improvement of $(x, y)$. If $x_{i_K} > \min\{\mu, s_{i_K}\}$, we can reduce the net transfer from $i_K$ by a small amount, and at the same time increase supplier $i^*$’s transfer, without changing that of any other agent (along or outside the path). We simply take away an $\varepsilon$-transfer between $i^*j_{K}$, and add it to the (possibly nil) transfer between $i^*j_1$. Of course $\varepsilon$ must be smaller than the flow on any even edge and $\min\{\mu, s_{i^*}\} - x_{i^*}$. If $x_{i_K} > \mu$, then the Pigou-Dalton transfer is a Lorenz improvement. If $x_{i_K} > s_{i_K}$, then it is a Pareto improvement. Thus we have a contradiction.

Hence, $E_\ast(R, G') \geq E_\ast(R, G)$ and $E_\ast(R, G')R_\ast E_{\ast}(R, G)$.

Case 2: $j^* \in D_-$.

Observe that the new link $i^*j^*$ can make the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition in $G'$ different from the one in $G$. If in the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition in $G'$, $i^* \in S'_\mu \cup S'_s$ then clearly $E_\ast(R, G')R_\ast E_{\ast}(R, G)$. So, assume $i^* \in S'_{\mu}$ and $j^* \in D'_+$. Let $E(R, G') = (x', y')$ be the egalitarian transfer solution in the economy $(R, G')$. Assume, without loss of generality, that $x'_{i^*} = \min\{\mu^2, s_{i^*}\}$, where $\mu^2$ is the second highest parameter obtained by the descending algorithm in $(R, G')$ and $i^* \in T^2$ in the partition of $S'_{\mu}$ given by the descending algorithm in $(R, G')$. Then, $j^* \in C_k$ for $k \geq 2$ in the partition of $D'_+$ given by the descending algorithm in $(R, G')$.

We will show that for the economy $(R, G)$, in any Lorenz Optimal Pareto allocation $(x, y)$, $x_{i^*} \leq \min\{\mu^2, s_{i^*}\}$. Let $(x, y)$ be such an allocation and let $\varphi$ be a $G$-flow which implements it.

For a contradiction, we assume $x_{i^*} > \min\{\mu^2, s_{i^*}\}$. We construct a transfer path $i^*j_1, j_1i_1, i_1j_2, j_2i_2, \cdots, j_Ki_K$, entirely in $G(S'_{\mu}, D'_+)$ such that

i) $\varphi_{i^*j_1}, \varphi_{i_{k-1}j_k} > 0$ for every odd edge $i_{k-1}j_k$; and ii) $x_{i_K} < \min\{\mu^2, s_{i_K}\}$.

Note that some agents may appear multiple times in the path.

Let $A^1 = \{j_1 \in D : \varphi_{i^*j_1} > 0\}$. Observe that $A^1 \subseteq D'_+ \setminus C^1$. Set $B^1 = g(A^1) \cap \{S'_{\mu} \setminus T^1\}$. Observe that $i^* \in B^1$ and $B^1 \setminus i^* \neq \emptyset$. If $A^1 \subseteq D'_+$ was only connected to $i^*$, then $x_{i^*} \geq d_{A^1} = x_{i^*}$, which is a contradiction to $x_{i^*} > \min\{\mu^2, s_{i^*}\} = x'_{i^*}$.

If there exists $i_1 \in B^1 \setminus i^*$ such that $x_{i_1} < \min\{\mu^2, s_{i_1}\}$, then the path
Suppose first Step 1.a: i.e., transfers (supplier \( i \)) are unchanged at \( s_i \). Otherwise, let \( A^2 = \{ j_2 \in D : \varphi_{i,j_2} > 0 \text{ for some } i_1 \in B^1 \} \) and consider the set \( B^2 = g(A^2) \cap \{ S_i \setminus T^1 \} \). Observe that \( B^1 \subseteq B^2 \) and by the same argument provided above \( B^2 \setminus B^1 \neq \emptyset \). If there exists \( i_2 \in B^2 \) such that \( x_{i_2} < \min \{ \mu^2, s_{i_2} \} \), then the path stops at \( j_1 i_1 \). Otherwise, we continue until we find \( i_K \) such that \( x_{i_K} < \min \{ \mu^2, s_{i_K} \} \). Since in \((x', y')\), for all \( i \in S_i \setminus T^1 \) received \( \min \{ \mu^2, s_i \} \) and \( x_{\text{ast}} > \min \{ \mu^2, s_{i_K} \} \), the iteration will find such an \( i_K \).

With our transfer path in hand, we now look for a Lorenz or Pareto improvement of \((x, y)\). If \( x_{i_K} < \min \{ \mu, s_{i_K} \} \), we can reduce the net transfer from \( \bar{\nu}_{i} \) by a small amount, and at the same time increase supplier \( i_K \)'s transfer, without changing that of any other agent (along or outside the path). We simply take away an \( \varepsilon \)-transfer between \( \bar{\nu}_{i} \) and add it to the (possibly nil) transfer between \( j_{K-1} i_K \). Of course \( \varepsilon \) must be smaller than the flow on any even edge and \( \min \{ \mu, s_{i_K} \} - x_{i_K} \). Thus we have a contradiction.

Hence, in any Lorenz Optimal Pareto allocation \((x, y)\), \( x_{\ast} \leq \min \{ \mu^2, s_{\ast} \} \) meaning that \( E_{\ast}(R, G') = E_{\ast}(R, G) \).

8.4 Proposition 4

The egalitarian transfer rule is monotonic and invariant, hence strategyproof as well.

Proof Because the egalitarian transfer rule is peak-only, it is enough to speak of the profiles of peaks, instead of the full fledged preferences. We fix a supplier \( i \in S \) and a benchmark profile \((s, d)\), with corresponding egalitarian transfers \((x, y)\). We write \( T^k, C^k, \mu^k, 1 \leq k \leq K \), for the partitions and corresponding parameters of the descending algorithm at \((s, d)\). Recall \( T^k = g(C^k) \setminus \{ g(C^1) \cup \ldots \cup g(C^{k-1}) \} \). We assume \( i \in T^\ell, x_i = \mu^\ell \land s_i \) (where \( a \land b = \min \{ a, b \} \)).

We consider a change of peak by agent \( i \) to \( s'_i \), and we write \( s'_i = s'_i \) for all \( i' \neq i \), so that \( s' = (s'_i, s_{i-}) \).

Step 1 Consider a change of peak from \( s_i \) to \( s'_i \) such that \( i \in S_+(s, d) = S_+(s', d) \). Then \( x_i = s_i \) and \( x'_i = s'_i \).

In the rest of step 1, we consider a change of peak from \( s_i \) to \( s'_i \) such that \( i \in S_-(s, d) = S_-(s', d) \).

Step 1.a: Suppose first \( s'_i > s_i \). We show \( x'_i \geq x_i \). 

First case: \( s_i > \mu^\ell = x_i \). Then the partition and corresponding parameters are unchanged at \( s' \) so that \( x'_i = x_i \).

Second case: \( s_i = x_i \leq \mu^\ell \). Then \( T^k, \mu^k \) are unchanged for \( 1 \leq k \leq \ell - 1 \),
but $T^\ell, \mu^\ell$ may change. However for $\mu = s_i$

$$\sum_{j \in T^\ell} \mu \land s_j' \leq \sum_{j \in T^\ell} \mu^\ell \land s_j' = d_C^\ell$$

Therefore if $T^\ell$ changes, the new set $\tilde{T}^\ell$ contains $i$ and $\tilde{\mu}^\ell \geq s_i$, hence $x_i' \geq s_i = x_i$.

**Step 1.b:** Suppose $s_i > s_i'$. If $s_i' \leq x_i$ notice that $i \in S_-(s', d)$ implies $x_i' \leq s_i'$ so we are done. So we are left with the case $s_i > s_i' > x_i = \mu^\ell$, that requires more work. We prove by induction on $\ell$ that the first $\ell$ terms $T^k, \mu^k, 1 \leq k \leq \ell$, of the partition and corresponding parameters are unchanged at $s'$. We write $\tilde{T}^k, \tilde{\mu}^k$ for the latter.

Suppose $\ell = 1$, then $\sum_{j \in T} \mu^1 \land s_j = \sum_{j \in T} \mu^1 \land s_j'$ for all $T \subseteq S_-(s, d)$, so the claim holds.

Next suppose $\ell \geq 2$. Assume $T^1 \neq \tilde{T}^1$ and derive a contradiction. This implies there exists a coalition $C^* \subseteq D_+(s, d)$ such that $C^* \neq C^1$ and

$$\sum_{j \in g(C^*)} \mu^1 \land s_j' \leq d_{C^*}$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

Indeed suppose (14) fails for all $C \subset C^1$: as $s$ and $s'$ coincide in $T^1 = g(C^1)$, we would get $T^1 = \tilde{T}^1$. Fix a coalition $C^*$ as in (14), and set $T^* = g(C^*)$; note that $T^*$ must contain $i$, hence $T^* \cap T^\ell$ is non empty. By definition of the descending algorithm, the sets

$$g(C^* \cap C^1) = T^{*1} \cup \cdots \cup T^{*k-1} \cup T^{*k} \setminus \{T^{*1} \cup \cdots \cup T^{*k-1}\} = T^{*k}$$

are pairwise disjoint and moreover

$$\left(\sum_{T^{*k}} \mu^k \land s_j \geq d_{C^* \cap C^k} \text{ for all } k\right) \Rightarrow \sum_{1 \leq k \leq \ell} \sum_{j \in T^{*k}} \mu^k \land s_j \geq d_{C^*}$$

In view of (14) and of $g(C^*) = T^{*1} \cup \cdots \cup T^{*K}$ this gives

$$\sum_{1 \leq k \leq \ell} \sum_{j \in T^{*k}} \mu^k \land s_j \geq \sum_{1 \leq k \leq \ell} \sum_{j \in T^{*k}} \mu^1 \land s_j'$$

For all $k \neq \ell$, we have $\mu^k \leq \mu^1$ and $s = s'$ in $T^{*k}$, implying $\sum_{j \in T^{*k}} \mu^k \land s_j \leq \sum_{j \in T^{*k}} \mu^1 \land s_j'$. As $\mu^\ell$ is strictly smaller than $\mu^1, s_i'$, and $s_i$, and $T^{*\ell}$ is non empty (contains $i$), we have $\sum_{S \cap S'} \mu^\ell \land s_j < \sum_{S \cap S'} \mu^1 \land s_j'$. The desired contradiction follows and we conclude $T^1 = \tilde{T}^1$.  

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To show next $T^2 = \tilde{T}^2$, we replicate the above argument as follows. If $\ell = 2$, then $\sum_{j \in T} \mu_2^2 \land s_j = \sum_{j \in T} \mu_2^2 \land s_j'$ for all $T \subseteq S_-(s,d)$ because $\mu_2 < s_i, s_i'$, so the claim holds. If $\ell \geq 3$ and $T^2 \neq \tilde{T}^2$, we can pick a coalition $C^* \subseteq D_+(s,d) \setminus C^1$ such that $C^* \neq C^2$ and

$$\sum_{j \in g(C^*) \setminus T^1} \mu_2^2 \land s_j' \leq d_{C^*}$$

and proceed as above by decomposing $C^*$ along $C^k$, $2 \leq k \leq K$. The induction step is now clear.

**Step 2** In step 1 we proved monotonicity for shifts of $s_i$ when $i \in S_+(s,d)$, or $i \in S_-(s,d)$, and the decomposition does not change after the shift. We now discuss the shifts that do change the decomposition.

**Step 2.1** Suppose $i \in S_+(s,d)$, so $x_i = s_i$. If $s_i' < s_i$ the GE decomposition (Lemma 2) does not change, so $i \in S_+(s',d)$ and $i$ transfers $s_i' < s_i$. Consider the critical report $s_i^*, s_i^* > s_i$, if any, at which the GE decomposition and the status of agent $i$ change. By Lemma 2 ii), there is no change in the decomposition at $s_i'$ as long as $s_i' < d_{f(T) \cap D_-(s,d)}$ for all $T \subseteq S_+(s,d)$. Thus $s_i^*$ is the smallest number such that

$$s_{T \setminus i} + s_i^* = d_{f(T) \cap D_-(s,d)} \tag{15}$$

for some subset $T$ of $S_+(s,d)$ containing $i$. Let $T^*$ be the largest $T$ satisfying (15) (well defined by the usual submodularity argument). Recall from the proof of Lemma 2 that $\tilde{T} = (S_- \cup S_0)(s,d)$ is the largest solution of $\arg\max_{T \subseteq S} \{s_T - d_{f(T)}\}$. Writing $s^* = (s_i^*, s_-)$, we have

$$s_{\tilde{T}} - d_{f(\tilde{T})} = \max_{T \subseteq S} \{s_T - d_{f(T)}\} \text{ and } s_{T^*}^* - d_{f(T^*) \cap D_-(s,d)} = 0$$

and $T^*, \tilde{T}$ are disjoint. Therefore $\max_{T \subseteq S} \{s_T^* - d_{f(T)}\} = \max_{T \subseteq S} \{s_T - d_{f(T)}\}$ and the largest solution of $\arg\max_{T \subseteq S} \{s_T^* - d_{f(T)}\}$ is now $(S_- \cup S_0)(s^*) \cup T^* = (S_- \cup S_0)(s^*)$. Moreover $S_-(s,d)$ is still a solution of $\arg\max_{T \subseteq S} \{s_T^* - d_{f(T)}\}$, therefore it is the smallest. So $i \in S_0(s^*, d)$.

Next $(x_{[S_+]}, d_{[D_-]}) \in A(G(S_+, D_-))$ and $T^* \subseteq S_+(s,d)$ together imply

$$x_{T^*} \leq d_{f(T^*) \cap D_-(s,d)} \tag{16}$$

We have $s_{[S_+] \leq} x_{[S_+]}$, so $s_i^* < x_i$ would imply $s_{T^*}^* < x_{T^*}$, and, together with (16), a contradiction of (15) for $T^*$. Therefore

$$s_i^* \geq x_i \geq s_i \tag{17}$$
Step 2.2 Suppose \( i \in S_-(s, d) \). There is a critical peak \( s^*_i \) below \( s_i \) at which the decomposition changes for the first time. The details of the decomposition at \( s^* \) are similar and they only matter to prove \( i \in S_0(s^*, d) \) and

\[
s^*_i \leq x_i \leq s_i \tag{18}
\]

Step 3 Consider now a shift from \( s_i \) to \( s'_i \) when \( i \in S_0(s, d) \). If \( s'_i > s_i \), we have \( i \in S_+(d', d) \). Then in the downward shift of supplier \( i \)’s peak \( s'_i \), the critical value at which the status of \( i \) changes is \( s_i \) (step 2.2), so by (18) \( s'_i = x'_i \). Symmetrically \( s'_i < s_i \) implies \( i \in S_+(d', d) \) and \( s_i \) is the critical value starting from \( s'_i \) (step 2.1), so (17) gives \( x'_i \leq s_i \).

It remains to look at a shift from \( s_i \) to \( s'_i \) such that \( i \in S_+(s, d) \) and \( i \in S_-(s, d) \). This requires \( s'_i > s_i \) and the critical value \( s^*_i \) starting from \( s_i \) is the same as the critical value starting from \( s'_i \). Therefore (17) and (18) imply

\[
s_i \leq x_i \leq s^*_i \leq x'_i \leq s'_i
\]

Step 4 The invariance property is clear from (17) and (18) and the arguments of step 2.

8.5 Characterization Theorem

The egalitarian transfer rule \( E \) is characterized by Pareto optimality, strategyproofness, voluntary trade, and equal treatment of equals.

The egalitarian transfer rule selects by construction \( E(R) \in PO^*(G, s, d) \) for all \( R \), and \( E_i(R) \leq s_i, E_j(R) \leq d_j \) ensure voluntary trade. The other properties are proven in Propositions 3-4. Conversely we fix a rule \( \psi \) meeting the four properties listed above.

Step 1 If the rule \( \psi \) satisfies Pareto optimality, strategyproofness, and voluntary trade, then \( \psi(R) \in PO^*(G, s, d) \) for all \( R \in R \cup D \).

By Proposition 1 this amounts to show that \( \psi_i(R) > s_i \) is impossible for \( i \in S_+(s, d) \), and \( \psi_j(R) > d_j \) is impossible for \( j \in D_+(s, d) \). Say \( \psi_i(R) > s_i \) and choose \( R'_i \in R \) such that \( s[R'_i] = s_i \) and \( 0P'_i \psi_i(R) \). Recall from Lemma 3 and the comments immediately before that \( \psi \) is own-peak-only, in particular \( \psi_i(R) = \psi_i(R'_i, -R_i) \), hence a contradiction of voluntary trade. As usual the proof of the other statement is similar.

Step 2 In view of Step 1 it remains to prove that for all \( R \) the projection of \( \psi(R) \) on \( S_-(s, d) \) and \( D_-(s, d) \) coincides with that of \( E \). We focus on \( S_-(s, d) \), omitting the similar argument for \( D_-(s, d) \). From \( \psi(R) \in \)

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\( \mathcal{PO}^*(G, s, d) \), the projection \( \psi_{[S_-(s, d)]}(R) \), denoted \( x \) for simplicity, satisfies the following inequalities

\[
 x_T \leq d_f(T) \text{ for all } T \subset S_-(s, d) \text{ and } x_{S_-(s, d)} = d_{D_+(s, d)} \tag{19}
\]

\( x_i \leq s_i \text{ for all } i \in S_-(s, d) \tag{20} \)

For the submodular cooperative game \((S_-(s, d), v)\) with \( v(T) = d_f(T) \) the system (19) means that \( x \) is in the core; and (20) captures voluntariness of trade.

**Step 2.1** In this step we consider a profile \( R \) in which all suppliers have the same peak, \( s[R_i] = s[R_{i'}] \) for all \( i, i' \in S \) (there are no constraints on the preferences of demanders). For simplicity we write \( S \) instead of \( S_-(s, d) \).

We use ETE to show that \( x = \psi_{[S_-(s)]}(R) \) is precisely \( \overline{\pi} = \mathcal{E}_{[S_-(s)]}(R) \), the Lorenz dominant transfer profile within the set defined by the system (19),(20).

**Claim 1.** Pick an agent in \( S_- \), denoted \( 1 \) for simplicity, such that \( x_1 = x^{*\alpha} \), where \( \alpha = |S_-| \) (so \( x_1 = \max_{S_-} x_i \)). Then:

\[
 x_1 = \overline{\pi}_1 = x^{*\alpha} = \overline{\pi}^{*\alpha} \tag{21}
\]

As \( \overline{\pi} \) is Lorenz dominant we have \( x^{*\alpha} \geq \overline{\pi}^{*\alpha} \). If \( x_i = x^{*\alpha} \) for all \( i \in S_- \), then \( x = \overline{\pi} \) (because \( x_{S_-} = \overline{\pi}_{S_-} \)) and we are done. Suppose next there is at least one \( i \in S_- \) such that \( x_i < x^{*\alpha} \). We show that if \( x_i < s_i \), there exists a coalition \( S(i) \subset S_- \) containing \( i \) but not \( 1 \), such that \( x_{S(i)} = v(S(i)) \).

Suppose, on the contrary, \( x_T < v(T) \) for all \( T \subset S_- \) containing \( i \) but not \( 1 \). A Pigou Dalton transfer from \( x_1 \) to \( x_i \) transforms \( x \) into \( x' \) such that \( x'_1 = x_1 - \varepsilon, x'_i = x_i + \varepsilon \), while \( x \) and \( x' \) coincide elsewhere. From \( x_i < s_i \) and the above assumption, we can perform a small Pigou Dalton transfer from \( x_1 \) to \( x_i \) such that \( x' \) satisfies (19),(20): this contradicts ETE.

We set \( S^* = \cup_{i} x_i < x^{*\alpha}, S(i) \). By submodularity of \( v \) we have \( x_{S^*} = v(S^*) \). By construction for all \( i \in N \backslash S^* \), \( x_i \) is \( x^{\alpha} \) or \( s_i \), hence \( x_i \geq \overline{\pi}_i \); moreover \( N \backslash S^* \) contains \( 1 \). On the other hand we have

\[
 \overline{\pi}_{S^*} \leq v(S^*) = x_{S^*} \Rightarrow \overline{\pi}_{N \backslash S^*} \geq x_{N \backslash S^*} \tag{22}
\]

Combining this with \( x_i \geq \overline{\pi}_i \) on \( N \backslash S^* \) gives (21).

**Claim 2** Pick agent 2 in \( S_- \), \( 2 \neq 1 \), such that \( x_2 = x^{*(\alpha - 1)} \). Then

\[
 x_2 = \overline{\pi}_2 = x^{*(\alpha - 1)} = \overline{\pi}^{*(\alpha - 1)} \tag{23}
\]

As \( \overline{\pi} \) Lorenz dominates \( x \), we have \( x^{*1} + x^{*2} \geq \overline{\pi}^{*1} + \overline{\pi}^{*2} \Rightarrow x^{*2} \geq \overline{\pi}^{*2} \). If \( x_i = x^{*(\alpha - 1)} \) for all \( i \in S_- \{1\} \), then \( x = \overline{\pi} \) and we are done. Suppose
now there is at least one \( i \in S_\cdot \setminus \{1\} \) such that \( x_i < x^\*(\alpha-1) \). By the same argument as above, if \( x_i < s_i \) there exists a coalition \( S(i) \subset S_\cdot \) containing \( i \) but not 2, such that \( x_{S(i)} = v(S(i)) \) (else we can construct a Pigou-Dalton transfer from 2 to \( i \), contradicting ETE). Set \( S^* = \bigcup_{i:x_i < x^*(\alpha-1),s_i} S(i) \), then \( x_{S^*} = v^+(S^*) \) by submodularity of \( v \); moreover for all \( i \in N \setminus S^* \), \( x_i \) is \( x^\alpha \) or \( s_i \), in particular \( x_i \geq \pi_i \). On the other hand \( \pi_{N \setminus S^*} \geq x_{N \setminus S^*} \) as in (22), so \( x \) and \( \pi \) coincide in \( N \setminus S^* \), that contains 2. Property (23) follows.

The inductive argument establishing \( x = \pi \) is now clear.

**Step 2.2** We just proved that \( \psi \) and \( E \) coincide on \( S \) when all suppliers have the same peak. We use another induction argument, inspired by Ching (1993), to establish this equality for an arbitrary profile \( R \). Recall our notation: for \( R,R' \in R^{S\cup D} \) and \( T \subset S \), \((R_{[T]},\tilde{R}_{([S \setminus T] \cup D)})\) is the profile equal to \( R \) for agents in \( T \) and to \( \tilde{R} \) elsewhere.

Fix a profile \( \tilde{R} \) where all suppliers have identical preferences, an integer \( n, 0 \leq n \leq |S| - 1 \) and consider the following subset of preference profiles

\[
R \in B(\tilde{R},n) \iff \exists l
\]

for some \( T \subset S : |T| \leq n \) and \( R_{([S \setminus T] \cup D)} = \tilde{R}_{([S \setminus T] \cup D)} \) and \( s[\tilde{R}_i] \geq s[R_i] \) if \( i \in S \). We prove by induction on \( n \) the following property \( H^+(n) \): for all \( R \in R^{S\cup D} \) and all \( T \subset S \)

\[
R \in B(\tilde{R},n) \Rightarrow \psi_i(R) = E_i(R) \text{ for all } i \in S
\]

Step 2.1 establishes \( H^+(0) \). Assume now \( H^+(n-1) \) is true, and fix \( R \in B(\tilde{R},n) \) with \( R_{([S \setminus T] \cup D)} = \tilde{R}_{([S \setminus T] \cup D)} \) and \( |T| = n \).

We prove first \( \psi_i(R') = E_i(R') \) for \( i \in T \). Pick such an agent and set \( R' = (R_{[T \setminus i]}, \tilde{R}_{([S \setminus T] \cup \{i\} \cup D)}) \in B(\tilde{R},n-1) \). By the inductive assumption \( \psi_i(R') = E_i(R') = x'_i \); by Pareto optimality and the definition of \( B(\tilde{R},n) \)

\[
s[\tilde{R}_i] \geq s[R_i] \geq \psi_i(R), E_i(R)
\]

If \( s[R_i] \geq E_i(R) > \psi_i(R), Monotonicity \) implies \( E_i(R') \geq E_i(R), \) and Invariance gives \( \psi_i(R') = \psi_i(R), \) hence a contradiction. If \( s[R_i] \geq \psi_i(R) > E_i(R), \) we have similarly \( \psi_i(R') \geq \psi_i(R) \) (Monotonicity), and \( E_i(R') = E_i(R) \) (Invariance).

It remains to check \( \psi_i(R) = E_i(R) \) for \( i \in S_\cdot \setminus T \). This is clear in \( S_\cdot \setminus S_\cdot \setminus T \), so we check it for \( S_\cdot \setminus (S_\cdot \setminus T) \). Write \( S_\cdot = S_\cdot \setminus T \) and \( x = \psi_{[S_\cdot]}(R), \pi = E_{[S_\cdot]}(R) \) as in step 2.1. Consider the set

\[
C(R) = \{z \in \mathbb{R}^{S_\cdot \setminus T}_+ \mid (z, \pi_{[S_\cdot \setminus T]}) \text{ satisfies system (19),(20)}\}
\]

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Clearly $\overline{\pi}_{S \setminus T}$ is still Lorenz dominant in $\mathcal{C}(R)$, hence we can mimic the proof of Step 2.1 to show that ETE and Pareto optimality imply $x = \overline{\pi}$ in $S \setminus T$. Indeed $\tilde{R}_{S \setminus T}$ consists of preferences with identical peaks, therefore we can apply ETE to any pair of agents in $S \setminus T$. Moreover $\mathcal{C}(R)$ is defined by the system

$$z_{T'} \leq \tilde{v}(T') = v(T' \cup [T \cap S_-]) - \overline{\pi}_{[T \cap S_-]} \quad \text{for all } T' \subset S_- \setminus T, \text{ and } z_{S_- \setminus T} = \overline{\pi}_{S_- \setminus T}$$

Then the proof proceeds exactly as in step 2.1. We omit the details.

We have proved that $\mathcal{H}^+([S] - 1)$ for any choice of $\tilde{R}$. Now consider an arbitrary profile $R$ and choose $i$ in $S$ such that $s[R_i] \geq s[R_{i'}]$ for all $i' \in S$. Choosing for $\tilde{R}$ the profile of preferences $\tilde{R}_{i'} = R_i$ for all $i' \in S, \tilde{R}_{j[D]} = R_{j[D]}$ for all $j \in D$, we have $R \in \mathcal{B}(\tilde{R}, [S] - 1)$ and the proof is complete.